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A RESPONSE TO SWINBURNE'S LATEST DEFENSE
OF THE ARGUMENT FOR DUALISM
Kent Reames

This paper responds to Swinburne's recent article "Dualism Intact," which defends
his argument for a body/soul du'llism. It pays particular attention to his defense
against the charges of Alston and Smythe, especially the appeal to the "quasiAristotelian assumption," on which the essence of a thing is necessary to its being
the thing that it is. I argue that this defense does not save the argument, but only
makes clear that its apparent plausibility rests on an ambiguity between two understandings of the nature of logical possibility. Swinburne's argument draws on and
requires both understandings at different points in his argument, but the two are
incompatible at the key point.

In a recent issue of Faith and Philosophy,' Richard Swinburne restates and defends
against several attacks his earlier argument, originally given in chapter 8 of The
Evolution of the Sou/,' for body / soul dualism. In this paper, I look in particular at
his defense of the argument in response to the charges of William P. Alston and
Thomas W. Smythe. I will argue that Swinburne's defense does explain why
Alston and Smythe's argument does not succeed, but that precisely in so doing it
opens the argument to another line of attack.

1. Summarizing Swinburne's argument
The original argument is quite straightforward. Given (p. 69)
p = 'I am a conscious person and I exist in 1984'
q = 'My body is destroyed in the last instant of 1984'
r = 'I have a soul in 1984'
s = 1 exist in 1985'
x ranges over all consistent propositions compatible with (p and q) and
describing 1984 states of affairs.
(x) = 'for all propositions x'
= 'it is logically possible that'; & = 'and'; - = 'not'

o

Swinburne puts forward three premisses:
(1)
(2)
(3)

P
(x) 0 (p & q & x & s)
- 0 (p & q & -r & s)
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(1) states simply that 1, a conscious person, exist in 1984. (2) says that it is logically possible that my soul (that is, that part of me which makes me me) will survive my bodily death (which will occur at the last moment of 1984) and live into
1985, no matter what other conditions obtain in 1984. Of course, there is nothing
special about the moment of transition from 1984 to 1985; the claim is a general
one. (2) may thus be restated more simply as a claim that it is logically possible
that I will survive my bodily death. (3) claims that it is not logically possible that
I survive my bodily death unless I have a soul.
From (2) and (3) it follows, according to Swinburne, that my lack of a soul (-r)
does not fall within the range of propositions denominated under x. And since r describes a 1984 state of affairs, -r is not compatible with (p & q).

(4)

- 0 (p & q & -r)

Since whether or not I am killed at the last instant of 1984 is obviously irrelevant
to whether or not I have a soul during the rest of 1984, q can be dropped, leaving
(5)

- 0 (p & -r)

(6)

p->r.

or

My conscious existence in 1984 (or at any other time) implies that I have a soul.
In their response to this argument, Alston and Smythe grant that "the survival of a human person ... in a wholly different body, or in disembodied form, is
logically possible."3 However, they argue, this logical possibility is entirely compatible with one's in fact having no soul: "if it is conceivable that I am partly a
soul, why would it cease to be conceivable if in fact I am only a body?"4 That is,
the conceivability of my soul-possession, like conceivability in general, does not
rest on any contingent state of affairs in the world, and hence certainly not on my
actual soul-possession. They speculate that Swinburne has made an all too common error surrounding issues of logical necessity, confusing the necessity of the
consequence with the necessity of the consequent.'
Swinburne's defense of the soundness of the argument relies on what he calls
"the quasi-Aristotelian assumption" (71), which states that a thing's continuity
requires that it "continue to be made at least in part of some of the same stuff of
which it was made previously" (68). If my desk tomorrow is the same desk as
today, it must contain some of the same stuff. In other words, the desk has an
essence; it is its essential features which continue in existence over time." Given
this assumption, Swinburne continues, if I am only a body, then I am necessarily
only a body, and could not have been otherwise. He cites Kripke as follows:
"'Supposing this lectern is in fact made of wood, could this very lectern have
been made from the very beginning of its existence from ice, say frozen from
water in the Thames? One has a considerable feeling that it could not."" More
generally, the actual essence of a thing - in the case of the desk, its made-fromwoodness - is necessary to its being the thing-which-it-is; if it were made from
something else, it would be something else. In the case of humans and souls: if
my essence in fact is my soul, then that essence could not logically have been
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other than it is. In general, it is not logically possible that a thing's essence be
other than it in fact is. In short, when we are talking about essences, given the
quasi-Aristotelian assumption, possibility implies actuality.
Now, Swinburne does not put the point quite so bluntly, so it is perhaps
worth taking a moment to make it clear that this is indeed what he means to say.
In the original argument, Swinburne had stated what he had shown thus:
"From the mere logical possibility of my continued existence there follows the actual
fact that there is now more to me than my body.... "8 Again, as an introductory
comment to his argument against Alston and Smythe's rejection of his original
argument, Swinburne writes: "Alston and Smythe make what is in effect a claim
that no mere assertions about logical possibility could have any tendency to
show what I in fact am (e.g. that I am not only a body). But given the quasiAristotelian assumption..., their claim must be false." (71) When we are talking
about essences, given the quasi-Aristotelian assumption, possibility implies actuality.
Moreover, it seems clear that this is the point of the original argument as well:
it moves from the logical possibility of my possessing a soul to its actuality.
Because on Swinburne's account, dualists define the soul as "the part of the person which is necessary for his continued existence,"9 his premise
(2)

(x) 0 (p & q & x & s)

(it is logically possible that I survive the destruction of my body), is already a
claim that it is logically possible tlUlt I have a soul which may survive my body.
The rest of the argument then moves from the logical possibility that I have such
a soul, to its actuality.
In short, Swinburne argues that, within certain limits, possibility implies actuality. With respect to the particular question of soul-possession, he argues that it
therefore follows from the logical possibility that humans have souls, that they in
fact have them.
2. Swinburne on the nature of logical possibility

and the quasi-Arisote/ian assumption
In preparation for my response to Swinburne, 1 want to focus on the notion of
logical possibility operative in his argument. What I call the "normal" understanding of logical possibility includes something like the following. Possibility
is wider than actuality; in other words, the actual is a proper subset of the possible. Certain things exist, but they might not have existed; their existence is contingent rather than necessary. In short, normally, possibility does not imply
actuality.
Swinburne, of course, has no stake in denying any of these claims as general
philosophical propositions. But he does deny them with respect to a certain
restricted set of claims. This is what his invocation of the quasi-Aristotelian
assumption, backed up by reference to Kripke's argument, is intended to establish. Whatever essence a thing has, it has it necessarily. Within the realm of
essences, Swinburne holds that in an important sense the actual is not a proper
subset of the possible. Let us call this a restricted understanding of the nature of
logical possibility.
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Swinburne's argument, then, seems to assume that although most of the time
the nonnal understanding of logical possibility applies, it does not do so all the
lime; when we are talking about the essences of tlungs, it is the restricted understanding which applies. I want to emphasize that I have no problem with this.
At least, it is a comprehensible way of talking, and it may help us to solve or at
least think more clearly about particular problems. Let us therefore grant HUs
claim. As applied to humans, the claim is as follows: whatever the essence of
the human actually is, whether that be body alone, or body-pIus-soul, or soul
alone, it is the only essence that the human could possibly have.

3. Response to Swinburne
But while I have no problem with making this intellectual move, it is nonetheless a move which changes the shape of the nature of logical possibility in ways
which undercut Swinburne's argument. In particular, my thesis is that once the
move is made, Swinburne's claim that it is logically possible that the essence of
the human includes a soul is an arbitrary claim which he has given us no reason
to accept. In other words, Swinburne's defense of the soundness of his argument
undercuts the argument's key premise.
I will pursue this argument in two stages. First, I will argue that from the
quasi-Aristotelian assumption itself, and indeed from the validity of
Swinburne's original argument, nothing follows about the actual nature of the
human. Parallel reasoning can prove, given the premise that it is logically possible that I do not have a soul, that in fact I do not have a soul. If we want to know
which is the correct description of the actual essence of humans, with-a-soul or
without-, we will need to turn from a formal consideration of the argument to
the particular content which Swinburne claims it ought to have. So in the second
stage, I will take this up, arguing that Swinburne's attempt to ground the superiority of his claim (2) over a materialist version by appeal to apparent conceivability fails, because on the restricted understanding of logical possibility, apparent
conceivability is not evidence for logical possibility.

3a. The parallel argument
The parallel argument goes as follows:
p'
q'
r'
s'
x'

I exist in 1997
My body is destroyed in the last instant of 1997
I do not have a soul in 1997
I do not exist in 1998
names all states of affairs compatible with (p' & q')

Given these symbols,
(1')

p'

means only that I exist.
(2')

(x') 0 (p' & q' & x' & s')
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means that it is logically possible, given all states of affairs compatible with my
existence up until the last moment of 1997, that I will not exist in 1998. And

(3')

- 0 (p' & q' & -r' & s')

means that if after existing in 1997 but having my body destroyed at the last
moment of 1997, I do not exist in 1998, then it is not logically possible that I have
a soul. From these, of course, by parallel reasoning, it follows that
(6') p' -> r'

- that is, that my existence implies that I do not have a soul.
At least two objections will be raised to this argument. The first objection is as
follows. One might reject (3'), by putting forward the possibility that in 1997 I
had a soul, but for reasons completely independent of my bodily death my soul
too perished at exactly the same moment my body did. Perhaps God annihilated it. If so, then (p' & q' & -r' & s') is logically possible. However, this objection
to the parallelism of my argument with that of Swinburne is to the point only if it
cannot be applied similarly to Swinburne's own argument. But it can be.
Against Swinburne's original argument, one can object that his own
(3) - 0 (p & q & -r & s)
(I cannot survive the destruction of my body except by having a soul) fails to
take note of the possibility that, despite my complete bodily destruction at the
last instant of 1984, nonetheless I continue to exist without having a soul after
God uses the same matter to miraculously reconstitute my body in another
place, perhaps on another plane of existence, or otherwise intervenes to ensure
my survival.
To this, it may be objected that God's keeping my body alive in another place
or on another plane counts as the continuation of my bodily life, and hence my
body was not really destroyed at all in the requisite sense. But I take it that the relevant question is whether or not I can survive this earthly life. Perhaps my body
will be changed radically. As Paul says, we will have "spiritual bodies" after the
resurrection. A materialist might want to say that in this life we are only bodies,
but that nonetheless after the eschatological resurrection of the body, we will be
miraculously reconstituted as spiritual bodies, bodies which are (say) the same in
essence (made of the same "stuff') as our previous bodies, but without their cormptibility. (To hold that all bodies are essentially cormptible would v:iolate at
least many of the classic Christian treatments of the story of Adam and Eve.)
Were this the case, a person who happened to die by bodily destmction the
instant before the eschatological resurrection would thus be a counterexample to
Swinburne's thesis that it is not possible for a purely material person to survive
the destruction of his or her body.lO
The point can be better stated as follows. Premise (2) ought to be understood
to mean "It is logically possible that I naturally, as it were, which is to say without
divine intervention, survive the destruction of my body." My (2') then denies
this. For this is what is at stake in having a soul. If I survive my bodily destruction, but only by a miracle of God, which breaks into the natural order of things
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under which I would not have survived my bodily destruction - an order of
things which holds, let us say, for every other sentient being in the history of the
universe - then it would be stretching things to say that before that miracle I
had a soul. In this sense, the objection to (3') fails. The point is not what may
happen in exceptional circumstances, but what happens most of the time, or at
least what could happen without invoking supernatural assistance. If I have a
soul, I "naturally" survive my bodily death - or at least I intrinsically have the
potential to survive without divine assistance. If not, I lack that potential.
The second objection to my attempted construction of a parallel argument is
that it begs the question against Swinburne. Swinburne says that Alston and
Smythe beg the question when they object to Swinburne's premise
(2)

(x) 0 (p &

q & x & s)

by inserting an "x" - namely, "I am essentially material in 1984" - which they
claim is compatible with (p & q) and nonetheless makes (2) false. (That is, if I am
essentially material, it is not logically possible that I survive the destruction of
my body.) Swinburne replies to this contention as follows.
"The claim ... that any x of the above type [that is, like Alston & Smythe'S]
is compatible with (p & q) amounts to the denial of my conclusion. Now it
is true that my argument will not convince anyone who claims to be more
certain that the conclusion is false than that the premises are true. But then
that does not discredit my argument-for no argument about anything
will convince someone in that position." (71)
Alston and Smythe thus beg the question against Swinburne. Does my parallel
argument do so as well? It does not, because it does not assert anything about
the reality of the objects in question. I am not more certain that Swinburne's conclusion is false than that his premises are true; I am bracketing that whole issue. I
am saying only that before we come to any conclusion about the relative adequacy of dualism and materialism, we ought to be clear about what the argument
presupposes about the nature of logical necessity. In other words, I am doing
precisely what Swinburne suggests when, immediately after the sentences I just
quoted, he writes: "My argument was designed explicitly for those prepared to
set aside philosophical dogma concerned explicitly with the mind/body issue,
and rely only on philosophical theses and intuitions about logical possibility
relating to other or wider issues." (71) Setting aside any particular considerations in favor of dualism or materialism, I have only argued that the appeal to
logical possibility by itself can be used equally well to support either side.

3b. Which argument is sound? Apparent conceivability and logiCilI possibility
Given this conclusion, it is time to tum from the formal aspects of the argument to the content which Swinburne wants to give it. I will continue to focus
on issues surrounding the nature of logical possibility rather than on dogma
about mind/body issues. In particular, the key question is how we know
whether something which purports to be logically possible is in fact logically possible. Swinburne suggests an answer to this question, but, I will argue, his sug-
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gestion is only valid with respect to the normal understanding of the nature of
logical possibility, and not with respect to the restricted understanding which (we
have granted) applies to arguments about the essences of things.
Swinburne suggests that in order to show that a purportedly logically possible claim is in fact logically possible, we ought to give
arguments which spell it out, which tell in detail a story of what it would
be like for it to be true and do not seem to involve any contradictions, i.e.
arguments from apparent conceivability. Apparent conceivability is evidence (though not of course conclusive evidence) of logical possibility. (70)
The arguments and stories go together. The argument is that it is conceivable
that a human may survive the destruction of his or her body. "If anyone does
not see that [conceivability] at first, a story can be told in a lot more detail of what
it would be like for it to be true, which would help the reader to see it." (71) To
come to see it is not something which requires a great deal of philosophi.cal training; Swinburne suggests "that most people not already having a firm philosophical position on the mind/body issue will grant my premises." (71)
However, all of this is problematic. On the restricted understanding of logical
possibility which Swinburne has told us applies to questions of essences, apparent conceivability is not evidence of logical possibility. Both stories are apparently conceivable,l1 but only one of them (at most) is logically possible. This is the
key point. Where logical possibility implies actuality, the assertion "It is logically
possible that p and it is also logically possible that not-p" is self-contradictory,
because it implies "p and also not-p."12 So although the two stories are both
apparently conceivable, they are not both logically possible. When both sides are
apparently conceivable, the conceivability of one side is not evidence for its logical possibility in the restricted sense.
Once we understand this, it becomes clear that when properly understood
Swinburne's claim (2), that it is logically possible (in the restricted sense) for a
human to survive the destruction of his or her body, is not a claim which most
ordinary people will affirm. They will affirm only that they can conceive of surviving, that as far as they can tell they might survive, their bodily destruction. But
this conceivability does not imply logical possibility, because it depends on the
telling of a particular story which itself mayor may not be logically po~sible (in
the restricted sense). Most people will say that they just don't know whether in
that sense it is logically possible or not.
In short, when logical possibility is understood in the restricted sense,
Swinburne has given no reason whatever to affirm his claim (2), that it is logically possible for a human to survive the destruction of his or her body. The apparent force of the argument rests on an ambiguity between the two sorts of logical
possibility.
None of this, of course, does anything to show that metaphysical dualism is
false. It is still a conceivable, and in that sense a possible, account of human
nature, however unpopular among contemporary philosophers. However,
Alston and Smythe are correct: we need to know more about dualism than that
it is conceivable if we are to know it to be actual.13

Chicago, Illinois
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NOTES
1. Richard Swinburne, "Dualism Intact." Faith and Philosophy 13/1 (January
1996), pp. 68-77. In my paper, page numbers in parentheses refer to this article.
2. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986.
3. William P. Alston and Thomas W. Smythe, "Swinburne's Argument for
Dualism," Faith and Philosophy (1994), p. 127.
4. Ibid, p. 130.
5. Swinburne is correct, in Alston and Smythe's view, to hold that "my being
only a body and my surviving without a body are not jointly logically possible," but this
does not imply "that if I am a body, it is not logically possible that I survive without a
body." Ibid, p. 129.
6. The" Aristotelian assumption" is that this "stuff" is matter; the broader
"quasi-Aristotelian assumption," which uses the broader term "stuff," simply allows
that the relevant stuff can be non-material, e.g., souL
7. Swinburne, op. cit., 72, quoting Saul Kripke, "Identity and Necessity" in (ed.)
Milton K. Munitz, Identity and Individuation (New York: New York University Press,
1971), p. 152.
8. The Evolution of the Soul, 154, my emphasis.

9.

The Evolution of the Soul, 146.

10. Of course, all this introduces specifically Christian notions, but that is hardly
inconsistent either with Swinburne's project, or with some of his arguments. See,
e.g., The Evolution of the Soul, 151: "We understand what is being claimed in fairy stories or in serious religious affirmations which affirm life after death" - and hence,
whether or not we believe these stories or affirmations, we ought to take what they
describe to be possible, and our philosophical theory ought to be able to make some
sense of them.
11. I can tell you a story which makes it apparently conceivable that humans
have souls, but then someone else can tell you a story which makes it apparently conceivable that humans do not have souls. Indeed, the existence of both sorts of stories
is not only imaginable but real; we can and do imagine ourselves both as having a
soul and as not having one. If only one side were apparently conceivable, there
would be no argument between materialists and dualists in the first place.
12. Tn other words, contrary to Alston and Smythe'S conjecture, Swinburne does
not confuse the necessity of the consequence with the necessity of the consequent.
On the contrary, he takes the unexpected step of asserting both that (a) it is not possible that I both have and do not have a soul, and that (b) if I have a soul, it is not possible that I do not have a souL In other words, it is precisely the move to the "restricted" understanding of the nature of logical possibility which allows him to evade
their critique.
13. I would like to thank Jamie Schillinger for his helpful comments on earlier
drafts of this paper.

